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ABSTRACT
While Private Equity (“PE”) funding is a preferred vehicle for
corporate growth in India, due to the ubiquitous role played by
company promoters, extant laws, and a complex regulatory and
compliance environment, PE funds prefer to take up a minority
shareholding in Indian companies. As a result, PE funds invest in
Indian companies in exchange for participation in the company’s
profits either through equity or convertible preferred stock or
convertible debt. The PE fund typically also requires a number of
investor control rights to be negotiated as part of the investment,
keeping in mind concerns related to minority shareholding in India.
While these contractual rights typically do not interfere with the
day-to-day management of the company, they serve as a check and
balance against promoter opportunism. These rights include
provisioning for the investor to participate in the governance of the
company through board nomination, quorum requirements and
veto powers. Investors may also require downside protection in the
form of anti-dilution and pre-emptive exit rights and preferred
payments upon liquidation.

* Associate Professor, Jindal Global Law School (JGLS), Director, Office of Academic
Planning, Co-ordination and Interdisciplinarity, Executive Director, Office of
Rankings, Benchmarking and Institutional Transformation and Executive Director,
Michigan-Jindal Centre for Global Corporate and Financial Law and Policy, O.P.
Jindal Global University (JGU). This paper would not have been possible without
the funding support received from the JGU Research Grants Committee (Grant No.
JGU/RGP/2018/013). The author is also immensely grateful to Ms. Chinar Gupta,
Ms. Ishita Malhotra, Mr. Soumil Desai, Mr. Nikhil Kapoor, and Mr. Dhananjay
Salkar, all students of the JGLS Class of 2019.

981

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

982

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

However, the nature of these investor control rights is a
departure from the default provisions under Indian company law.
These rights, which are borne out of a contractual arrangement
between the investor and the company/promoters, are also subject
to Indian contract law, under which contracts in variation of
applicable law are void. Additionally, due to excessive delays in the
Indian judiciary, any disputes that may arise are not referred to the
courts but are privately arbitrated or settled. Consequently, the
enforceability of these contracted rights has never been tested in
court.
This paper seeks to qualitatively identify the investor control
rights typically negotiated by PE funds using a sample of 158
privately held Indian companies which have received investments
from non-Indian PE funds in the last five years. This paper will go
on to analyse the limitations that Indian corporate and contract law
place upon parties’ freedom to contract, thus raising the question as
to whether the rights negotiated by PE investors are enforceable at
all. It is hypothesized that some of these rights may not be
enforceable in their customary form.
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INTRODUCTION

Private Equity (“PE”) funding is a preferred vehicle for
corporate growth in India, particularly for privately held, unlisted
companies.
For 2017-18, PE funds were responsible for
approximately USD 24.96 billion in investments in Indian
companies.1 However, due to extant laws and a complex regulatory
and compliance environment, PE firms typically do not use the
‘leveraged buyout’ model typically seen in western countries. 2
Instead, PE firms prefer to take up a minority shareholding position
in Indian investee companies. 3 As a result, much like in other
jurisdictions, PE investors become co-owners of the company,
sharing in risk and returns.4
a. Overview of the Indian Private Equity Model
In the Indian context, it is relevant to note the existence of
majority shareholders (often referred to as ‘promoters’ in India),
who usually play a ubiquitous role in the management,
administration and governance of Indian companies. 5 Majority
shareholding is usually passed down from generation to generation,
and it is not unusual to see multiple members of the same family
occupying leadership positions in family-owned companies even if
they lack the desirable qualifications or experience. 6 As a result,
minority shareholders, including PE firms, will be concerned with
1
Arpan Sheth et al., Indian Private Equity Report 2018, BAIN & CO. (Apr. 6,
2018),
https://www.bain.com/insights/india-private-equity-report-2018/
[https://perma.cc/S24Q-5E38].
2
See Jeffrey Blomberg, Private Equity Transactions: Understanding Some
Fundamental Principles, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 51, 51-52 (2008) (explaining the
fundamental principles of the private equity transactions).
3
See Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance and the Indian Private Equity
Model, 27 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 17, 35 (2015) (discussing how minority investors
in Indian firms address corporate governance issues).
4
See DARRYL J COOKE, PRIVATE EQUITY: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (London, Sweet
and Maxwell 2008).
5
See generally Rajesh Chakrabarti et al., Corporate Governance in India, 20 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 59 (2008) (discussing the history and economic reform of
corporate and public sector governance in India).
6
See Arjya B. Majumdar, India’s Journey with Corporate Social Responsibility—
What Next?, 33 J. L. & COM. 165, 182-184 (2015) (exploring the roles of family, culture,
and religion in the management of family run firms in India).
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the risk of self-opportunism that the Indian model of businesses
presents. These include tunneling, pyramidical ownership, crossholdings, and the use of non-public trusts and private companies to
own shares in group companies.7
As a result of the Indian PE model, Indian companies receive
investment from PE funds in exchange for participation in the
investee company’s profits through equity, convertible preferred
stock, or convertible debt, much like elsewhere in the world. 8
Keeping in mind the concerns related to minority shareholding in
India, as part of this investment, the PE fund typically also requires
a number of investor control rights negotiated as part of the
investment. These rights are either additions to the pre-existing
company related statutory rights or enable investors to contract
around immaterial or problematic company law provisions.9 While
these rights typically do not interfere with the day-to-day
management of the company, they enable investors to offer strategic
advice which, in turn, would indirectly preserve (or even enhance)
shareholding value, 10 as well as a check and balance against
promoter opportunism.
These investor control rights may be broadly divided into two
categories, viz. governance and investment protection. 11
Governance refers to mechanisms by which the company is run—
including board nomination, quorum rights at board and
shareholder meetings and information and affirmative voting
rights. Investment protection refers to a wide variety of mechanisms
which offer protection against lowered shareholder value for the
investor, sometimes at the expense of the company or other
shareholders. These may be classified into anti-dilution rights, preemptive rights, and preferred payments upon liquidation of the
7
See Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian
Corporate Governance, 21 NAT. L. SCH. INDIA REV. 1, 16 (2009) (listing these contractual
provisions as examples of how controlling family shareholders amplify their power
over corporations in countries like India and China).
8
See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 914-916 (2002) (comparing the purpose and
characteristics of preferred and common stock).
9
See JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES 144 (New York, Oxford University Press 2008)
(discussing non-listed companies and their corporate governance framework).
10
See Umakanth Varottil, The Advent of Shareholder Activism in India, 1 J.
GOVERNANCE 582, 610 (2012) (discussing interactive strategies between investors
and companies that add value for investor and their limitations).
11
See COOKE, supra note 4, at 222.
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investee company. These rights are encapsulated in an investment
agreement or a shareholders’ agreement, 12 which records the
commercial and behavioural terms of arrangement between the
investor, the company13 and, in the Indian context, the promoters.14
Of course, PE funds rely upon a number of other mechanisms to
further protect their investment, such as reliance on express
representations and warranties, and covenants made by the investee
companies and majority shareholders. However, these contractual
provisions are not unique to investment or shareholders agreements
and, therefore, they will not be part of this paper.
However, the nature of these investor control rights are
departures from the default provisions under Indian company law.
Further, because these rights are borne out of a contractual
arrangement between the investor and the company/promoters,
these rights are also subject to Indian contract law. Under the Indian
Contract Act of 1872, contracts which are in violation of applicable
law are void.15
This paper first seeks to empirically identify these special rights
typically negotiated by PE investors as part of an investment by way
of a private placement of shares in an Indian company. While this
has been done for other jurisdictions, 16 this is the first time a
comprehensive study of enforceability of shareholders agreement
provisions will be conducted with respect to Indian law. Having
identified these rights, this paper will go on to perform a doctrinal
analysis on the law applicable to these special rights in order to
ascertain whether these rights, in the form and manner in which
they are expressed, may be enforceable. I hypothesize that there is
a significant degree of homogeneity in the kind of rights negotiated
by PE investors and that—depending upon the wording of these
12
See generally V. Niranjan & Umakanth Varottil, The Enforceability of
Contractual Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares, 5 SUP. CT. CASES 1 (2012) (analyzing
investor arrangements and their validity and enforceability).
13
See COOKE, supra note 4, at 189-90; see also Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of
the Bar of the City of New York, The Enforceability and Effectiveness of Typical
Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 BUS. LAW. 1153 (2010) (explaining, in detail,
what shareholders agreement provisions should entail, legal principles, and
drafting considerations).
14
See Varottil, supra note 10, at 612 (noting that most Indian companies have
controlling shareholders known as promoters).
15
See Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of 1872, INDIA CODE (1872), sec. 23 (outlining
lawful and unlawful consideration).
16
See, e.g., Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York,
supra note 13, at 1155 (discussing the enforceability of shareholders agreements
under New York or Delaware law).
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rights in the investment/shareholders agreement—most, but not all,
of these rights would be enforceable.
b. Overview of Applicable Indian Company Law
As mentioned above, these special rights negotiated by PE
investors are typically crystallized into a shareholders’ agreement
(sometimes called an investment agreement).17 These agreements
are entered into by the PE investor, the promoter of the company
and the company itself. For privately held, unlisted companies,
these agreements and their contents are not publicly available—
since they primarily deal with the rights and obligations of
individual shareholders in a privately held company.
However, under Indian company law, the rights and obligations
of shareholders in a company, whether privately or publicly held,
are expressed and encapsulated in the Articles of Association or
bylaws of the company. 18 These Articles form a part of the
constitutional documents of the company and are integral to the
company’s existence and standing. Based on the Doctrine of
Constructive Notice 19 —inherited from the English Common Law
system—these Articles are also required to be made publicly
available, under sections 7 and 14 of the Indian Companies Act,
2013,20 along with any subsequent alterations thereof.21 While the
form of the Articles has been prescribed under Tables, F, G, H, I and
J in Schedule I of the ICA 2013, companies are enabled to include
other matters into the Articles that are necessary for its day to day
management. 22 Thus, companies are able to include the special
rights of individual shareholders into the Articles.

Id.
See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 5 (India)
(listing what the articles of association of a company should contain).
19
The Doctrine of Constructive Notice expects any person dealing with a
company to have knowledge and an understanding of the core constitutional
documents of the company—namely the Memorandum and Articles of Association
of the company, which are to be made publicly available. Id. § 399 (listing the
requirements for constructive notice).
20
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).
21
See id. § 14 (explaining the conditions under which articles may be altered
to convert a private company into a public company or vice versa).
22
Id. § 5(2) (holding that a company may add in articles for matters deemed
necessary).
17
18
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Thus, we note an inherent dichotomy between the public
availability of the Articles and the private nature of the shareholders
agreement. Both documents deal with the rights and obligations of
shareholders and the company. However, through a series of
judgments, the Indian judiciary has now established that where
there seems to be a conflict between the Articles and a shareholders’
agreement, the Articles will prevail.
c. Conflicts between the Shareholders Agreement and the Articles of
Association
In V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalkrishnan, 23 while dealing with a
conflict between a shareholders’ agreement (SHA) and the Articles
of the company, the Indian Supreme Court took the view that the
provisions of a SHA imposing restrictions on share transferability
even when consistent with the Companies Act, are to be authorized
only when they are incorporated in the Articles of the Company.
However, in Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India,24 the apex court
seemed to have overturned this view in an obiter, holding that an
omission of rights available to specific shareholders and mentioned
in a SHA but not in the Articles would not, by itself, render the rights
unenforceable. The court held that even if such special rights were
not mentioned in the Articles, parties aggrieved by a breach of the
provisions of the SHA could apply for remedies “under the general
law of the land.”25 However, the court also cautioned against rights
mentioned in the SHA which run contrary to the Articles. However,
this view was not part of the primary discussion of the Vodafone
judgment therefore, it may be argued that this view may be treated
as an obiter, at best. This view was expanded to other conflicts
between the Shareholders Agreement and the Articles of
Association, beyond rights on share transferability in IL&FS Trust
Co. Ltd. v. Birla Perucchini Ltd. 26 In the more recent judgment of
World Phone India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. WPI Group Inc. by the Delhi High
Court, the position taken in Vodafone was rejected and reliance was
placed on Rangaraj to hold that “the existence of an affirmative vote
cannot be recognized without a corresponding amendment to the
23
24
25
26

(1992) 1 SCC 160 (India).
(2012) 6 SCC 613 (India).
Id. para. 64.
(2004) 121 Comp Cas 335 (India).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/3

2020]

Investor Rights in Indian Private Equity

989

AoA.”27 Since then, the Indian Supreme Court has rejected a special
leave petition and did not entertain the matter of World Phone
further.28
Thus, where clauses in shareholders agreements run afoul of
company legislation, Indian courts have tended not to favour
complete freedom of contract. Even when clauses in shareholders
agreements are consistent with established company law, courts
have recognized and enforced such clauses only if these have been
incorporated in the Articles.29 This matter was finally put to rest
with section 5 of the ICA 2013, which was put into effect in 2014, to
the effect that any provisions of the Articles which provide for
entrenchment, i.e., where the Articles may be amended by a
corporate action more restrictive than a special resolution,30 ought
to be expressly provided for within the Articles themselves.
In other words, where there is a contradiction between the SHA
and the Articles of a company, the latter will prevail. As a result, in
order to give effect to the rights negotiated by PE investors, the
material provisions pertaining to shareholders’ rights mentioned in
the shareholders agreement are incorporated into the Articles.
Interestingly enough, while most Articles of companies that
have a PE investor as a shareholder have been modified to reflect
the provisions of the SHA, it is not unusual to note an interpretative
clause in the Articles suggesting that the provisions of the SHA
would prevail over the Articles. For example, HPL Additives
Limited received an investment of USD 10 million from Templeton
Strategic Emerging Markets Fund in October 2005.31 As part of this
(2013) 178 Comp Cas (Del.) 173 (India).
See Aditya Swarup, Conflicts between Shareholders Agreements and Articles of
a Company, INDIACORPLAW (June 6, 2013), https://indiacorplaw.in/
2013/06/conflicts-between-shareholders.html [https://perma.cc/Z6LE-5MKU]
(discussing how to proceed when there are conflicting provisions in an agreement).
29
See Umakanth Varotill, Shareholders Agreements: Clauses and Enforceability,
INDIACORPLAW (Dec. 31, 2010), https://indiacorplaw.in/2010/12/shareholdersagreements-clauses-and.html [https://perma.cc/KF8X-KTSN] (outlining Indian
court cases that discuss the enforceability of clauses when there are conflicts).
30
Under § 114 of the The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament,
2013 (India), a special resolution requires three fourths of the shareholders voting
in favour of the resolution. An affirmative voting right in favour of a particular
shareholder would be an apt example of a more restrictive requirement. See The
Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 114 (India) (explaining the
difference between an ordinary and special resolution).
31
See Templeton Strategic Invests $10 Million in Indian Specialty Chemicals
Company,
domain-b.com
(Nov.
21,
2005),
https://www.domain27
28
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transaction, the Articles of HPL Additives Limited was amended to
reflect the rights available to the investor. The Articles contain the
following clause: “In the event of any inconsistency between the
clauses hereinafter contained and the Agreement, 32 as defined
hereinbelow, the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail.”33
Given the developments in Rangaraj, IL&FS, Vodafone and more
recently, World Phone, clauses such as the one mentioned above are
clearly no longer enforceable and any rights that Templeton would
have negotiated will not be upheld in a court of law. Courts have
consistently rejected the notion that shareholders may place reliance
upon a SHA for the enforcement of a clause which does not reflect
in the Articles and have repeatedly opined that the Articles will
always prevail over any agreement entered into by the shareholders.
d. Conflicts between the Articles and Extant Law
However, the Articles are themselves subject to the provisions
of prevailing company law. Section 6 of the ICA 2013 provides
that—
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act—
(a) the provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
memorandum or articles of a company, or in any agreement
executed by it, or in any resolution passed by the company
in general meeting or by its Board of Directors, whether the
same be registered, executed or passed, as the case may be,
before or after the commencement of this Act; and
(b) any provision contained in the memorandum, articles,
agreement or resolution shall, to the extent to which it is
repugnant to the provisions of this Act, become or be void,
as the case may be.
In other words, the provisions of the Companies Act would
override the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the
b.com/investments/general/2005/20051121_invests.html
[https://perma.cc/8Y9D-G7J6].
32
Referring to the Shareholders Agreement entered into by HPL Additives
Limited, its promoters, and Templeton.
33
See HPL Additives Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 1, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF.,
GOV’T INDIA, at 5 (June 2, 2018).
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company or any other agreement executed, or resolution passed by
the company.34 A similar provision existed in the pre-2013 version
of Indian company law 35 and therefore, case law related to the
earlier provision would be applicable post-2013 as well.
Through various case law, the judicial trend seems to uphold
provisions in the Articles if they are in consonance with the Act.
Where the Act is silent, and the Articles provide for a higher
standard of governance, courts have also upheld such provisions.
For example, in Kapil N. Mehta, Surat v. Shree Laxmi Motors Ltd.,36 the
company passed a circular resolution which was allowed by the
Articles, but not envisaged under the Companies Act at the time. A
claim was raised to render the resolution void as the Companies Act
was silent on the matter. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the
claim on the grounds (inter alia) that in the absence of a specific law
that prohibited circular resolutions, the fact that the Articles enabled
the company to pass circular resolutions was not violative of the
Companies Act.37 The Gujarat High Court also placed reliance on
Center v. Rapps38 where the King’s Bench refused to strike down a
by-law merely because it created a new offence applicable only to
that company. Instead, the by-law could be held to be repugnant if
it makes unlawful that which the general law says is lawful or if it
expressly or by necessary implication professes to alter the general
law of the land.
However, when the Articles of a company seek or purport to
circumvent the law in force, courts have struck such articles down
as violative of Section 9, ICA 1956 or Section 6, ICA 2013, as the case
may be. For example, when the Articles provided for circulation of
a resolution without prior circulation of a draft resolution, in
contravention of the ICA 1956, the articles were struck down.39 In
both O.P Gupta v. Shiv General Finance (P) Ltd.40 as well as Surendra
Kumar Dhawan & Ors. v. R. Vir & Ors,41 the Articles mandated that
34
This has been upheld by a series of judgments before and after 2013 such as
ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sidco Leathers Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 10 SCC 452 (India); Darius
Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Ltd., (2015) 14 SCC 277 (India).
35
See The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 9 (India).
36
(2001) 103 Comp Cas (Guj.) 498 (1998) (India).
37 Id. paras. 32, 36.
38
(1902) 1 K.B. 160 at 166.
39
Mazda Theatres Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. New Bank of India, (1975) 1 ILR (Del.)
1 (India).
40
(1977) 47 Comp Cas (Del.) 279 (India).
41
MANU/DE/0282/1974 (India).
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the internal disputes within the members of the Company shall be
mandatorily referred to arbitration. The Courts in each case opined
that such an arrangement shall be contrary to the Act which
provides for a specific mechanism for the resolution of disputes
under Sections 397, 398 and 434 of the ICA 1956. The Madras High
Court suggests that it is the duty of the court to read the Articles
consistent with extant law. If a harmonious reading is not possible,
the Articles will have to yield to the ICA or other laws.42
e. Methodology
The Venture Intelligence database records all Venture Capital,
PE and M&A deals that involve Indian companies. As of July 2018,
approximately 7000 such deals had been recorded for PE alone.
Since 7000 deals is too large a sample size for the qualitative study
at hand, companies were selected on the following parameters.
1. In the absence of heightened regulatory and compliance
thresholds applicable to public listed companies, PE investors tend
to negotiate for special rights when investing into privately held
companies. Hence, only privately held companies were selected.
2. Due to compliance requirements overseas, a critical
assumption was made that foreign PE investors would be more
insistent upon meeting corporate secretarial compliance
requirements ex-post the investment transaction. As a result, Indian
companies which had received funding from foreign PE investors
were selected.
3. As this is a study of rights generally negotiated by PE
investors as against majority shareholders this study does not
concern itself with rights negotiated by multiple PE investors in the
same company where differential voting rights and therefore
varying levels of control and investment protection rights would be
found. Hence, I focused on PE deals that I identified at
approximately 263 privately held Indian companies which had
received at least USD 5 million as part of a round 1 investment from
a foreign PE investor.
Attempts were made to access the Articles of Association 43 of
these 263 companies through the website of the Ministry of
42
Southern Roadways Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1981) 130 ITR
(Mad.) 545 (1980) (India).
43
Hereinafter, “Articles.”
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Corporate Affairs, Government of India. One of the challenges in
gathering data in the form of updated Articles was that regularlyupdated Articles including special rights would not have been
uploaded to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs website. Of course,
not all Articles were readily available; many companies remain in
default of Sections 7 and 14 of the ICA 2013. As a result, of the 263
companies, the Articles of 158 were accessed and analysed.
f. Initial Analysis
Upon an initial analysis, rights similar to those in private equity
transactions in other jurisdictions were found to be present in most,
if not all, of these Articles. Most commonly found rights include:
Governance rights
o Board appointment rights by which an investor may appoint
one or more directors to the board of the company
o Quorum rights by which a valid, quorate meeting may take
place only with the presence of the representatives of the investor
o Veto rights on certain reserved matters, which require the
affirmative vote of the investor for a proposed resolution to be
passed
o Rights to demand information from the company
Investment Protection
o Pre-emptive rights to participate in future fundraising by the
company, with down round price protection
o A ‘lock-in’ of the shares of the promoter in which the
promoter is restricted from transferring its shares while the investor
is still a shareholder or for a specified amount of time, along with
tag along rights in favour of the investor
o Restrictions on the transfer of shares by the investor in
favour of the promoter in the form of a right of first offer (ROFO),
right of first refusal (ROFR), and drag-along rights
o Exit rights in the form of an exit by way of an IPO, strategic
sale to a third party, or as part of a fresh round of investment, buyback of shares or a put option in favour of the private equity investor
o A liquidation preference, where the company is required to
make a payout equal to the sum of the investment and a predetermined premium to the investor, in case of a liquidation event,
in preference over other stakeholders
This introductory section has set out the basis and background
to this paper, focusing on identifying the governance and
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investment protection issues that PE investors are faced with when
taking up a minority position in a promoter-owned, managed and
driven company, which is typical of a PE deal in India. We note that
in order to mitigate agency costs between the investor (principal)
and the promoter (agent), investors negotiate for special rights
which are then encapsulated into a shareholders or an investment
agreement. We further note that by law, the provisions of the
shareholders or investment agreement that impart these rights to the
investor must be reflected in the Articles of Association of the
company.
The next two sections of this paper will deal with a doctrinal and
qualitative analysis of these rights, classified into governance and
investment protection rights. Each specific type of right will be
taken up and examined against the provisions of the ICA 2013 and
applicable case law. It ought to be noted that many provisions of
the 2013 Act are reflective or substantially the same as the Indian
Companies Act of 1956.44 Therefore, reliance will be placed on case
law prior to 2013 as well. Deviations in the applicable law prior to
and after 2013 will be pointed out accordingly. A concluding section
will summarize the findings in this paper and will offer suggestions
for further research.
2.

GOVERNANCE

A PE investor will typically carry out comprehensive legal due
diligence prior to engaging in detailed negotiations with the
company, its management and promoters in order to discover legal,
compliance, and contractual risk. 45 These risks would then be
mitigated by a combination of conditions that would be required exante or ex-post the transfer of funds and allotment of securities, or
through specific representations, warranties and indemnities 46 in
order to provide retrospective comfort to the investor. However, the
investor will require prospective assurance after the investment,

The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 9 (India).
PRIVATE EQUITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 298-99 (H. Kent Baker et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 2015)
46
JEFFREY M. WEINER, Due Diligence in M&A Transactions: A Conceptual
Framework, in INSIDE THE MINDS: BUSINESS DUE DILIGENCE STRATEGIES 7, 14 (Aspatore
Books 2010).
44
45
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that the funds invested are being used in accordance with the
commercial understanding and intent of the parties.47
The shareholders agreement will therefore contain a number of
negative and positive governance controls over the internal
workings of the company which will be crystallized into the
shareholders agreement. We will now examine these controls
typically found in shareholders agreements, from an enforcement
perspective.
a. Appointment of Board Representatives
Barring those matters that, by law, must be deliberated by
shareholders (such as alteration of the Articles or of capital) the
Board of Directors of a company hold the ultimate authority in terms
of day-to-day management of the company, borrowing, lending,
investment of the funds of the company, approval of financial
statements, declaration of dividend, etc.48 In order to give effect to
the business plan and the manner in which the company is to be
governed after an investment transaction, as agreed to between the
investor, promoters, and the company, and to ensure that investors
have access to company information, investors will typically require
that they be able to appoint one or more directors on the board of
the company.49
For example, in 2015, Rivigo, a company engaged in information
technology and enabled services, received funding from two
investors, namely, Saif Partners and Spring Canter Investment
Limited to the tune of approximately USD 10 million. In doing so,
investors picked up approximately 27.42% of the paid-up issued
share capital of the company in aggregate. 50 As part of this
transaction, each of the investors received the right to nominate one
47
48

(India).

COOKE, supra note 4, at 222.
See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 179(3)

49
See Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra
note 13, at 1155.
50
Saif and Other Investor Deal with Rivigo, VENTURE INTELLIGENCE DATABASE
(April 2015), https://www.ventureintelligence.com/dealsnew/dealdetails.php?
value=773222414/0/ (accessible by subscription only). See also Anuradha Verma,
Logistics startup Rivigo raises $30M from SAIF Partners, others, VCCIRCLE (Dec. 17,
2015),
https://www.vccircle.com/logistics-startup-rivigo-raises-30m-saifpartners-others [https://perma.cc/RZ8K-XE56].
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director to the board of Rivigo, subject to applicable law and
provided the investors maintained a minimum shareholding
threshold.51
In general, the provisions of the ICA require that a director to the
Board of a company be appointed only at a general meeting.52 In the
absence of a specific provision requiring a special resolution, it may
be surmised that a simple resolution at a shareholders’ general
meeting may suffice to appoint a regular director. In common law
nations, the law has traditionally allowed shareholders to nominate
directors.53 This was the same position in the previous Companies
Act of 1956, which also allowed the nomination of a director,54 and
a subsequent appointment at a general meeting.55 The 2013 statute
clarifies this position and adds a special category of a ‘nominee’
director, provided that the Articles of the company enable the
appointment of one. 56 It is interesting to note that while these
directors are nominated by individual shareholders or lenders and,
for all intents and purposes, serve to represent the interests of the
nominating individual or institution, established UK common law
suggests that their primary fiduciary duty is to the company itself.57
This idea of a primary obligation owed to the company exists in
Indian law as well.58

51
See Rivigo Services Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 18, MINISTRY OF
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 15 (Nov. 4, 2016).
52
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 152 (India).
53
See Umakanth Varottil, Nomination of Directors by Shareholders,
INDIACORPLAW (Aug. 28, 2010), https://indiacorplaw.in/2010/08/nomination-ofdirectors-by-shareholders.html [https://perma.cc/FG4Z-GHKW] (discussing the
U.S. SEC’s decision to adopt a rule allowing shareholders to nominate directors).
54
The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 257 (India).
55
Id. § 263.
56
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 161(3) (India)
(“[S]ubject to the articles of a company, the Board may appoint any person as a director
nominated by any institution in pursuance of the provisions of any law for the time
being in force or of any agreement or by the Central Government or the State
Government by virtue of its shareholding in a Government company.” (emphasis
added)).
57
See Arjya B. Majumdar, The Fiduciary Responsibility of Directors to Preserve
Intergenerational Equity, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 149-151 (2019) (explaining that
directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties primarily to the corporation itself,
not necessarily individual shareholders). See also Peskin v. Anderson [2000] 1 BCLC
372 at 279 (UK).
58
See Madhu Kapur v. Rana Kapoor, (2016) 196 Comp Cas (Bom.) 345 (India)
(noting that board nominees owe no duty to their nominator or to the controlling
shareholders).
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A nominee director under the Companies Act may be appointed
by the Board as nominated by a financial or other institution or in
pursuance of any agreement or by the Government by virtue of its
shareholding in a Government company. This provision therefore
enables the company to enter into agreements that allow for the
nomination and consequent appointment of a director so
nominated. However, the question arises as to what happens when
an investor requires the appointment of a director and the majority
shareholders refuse to do so. Assuming that the person so
nominated does not fall afoul of the disqualifying provisions in
Section 164 of the Companies Act of 2013, is the Board bound to
appoint that particular person? Or is the concept of a nominee
director under Indian company law merely suggestive in nature,
that since directors must always be appointed by a simple majority
vote at a shareholders meeting, that the composition of the Board
must ultimately be determined by the majority shareholder?
In a case before the Company Law Board, it was held that if the
articles provide that share qualification is not applicable in the case
of persons nominated by certain shareholders as directors on the
board, the same is not contrary to Section 273 of the ICA 1956 and,
therefore, the application of Section 9 of the ICA 1956 does not
arise. 59 This question was also indirectly referred to in K.
Radhakrishnan v. Thirumani Asphalts & Felts (P.) Ltd. & Ors60 where
the articles provided for a particular individual to be appointed as a
lifetime director. The Madras High Court upheld the same.
However, where the appointment of a director was made as per the
provisions of a will of a director who had passed away, the Bombay
High Court held that this amounted to an assignment of the post,
which was violative of the ICA 1956 and the will and articles were
struck down to that extent.61
In Kashinath Tapuriah v. Incab Industries Ltd., 62 the Articles
authorized certain individuals to appoint and remove the chairman
of the company. Accordingly, the chairman had been appointed.
Subsequently however, in the absence of the regular chairman of the
Company, the existing chairman was removed via a resolution
passed by the Board pursuant to an article authorizing the board to
59
Mrs. Aruna Suresh Mehra v. Jifcon Tools Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1998) 94 Comp
Cas 329 (India).
60
MANU/TN/0391/1999 (India).
61
Oriental Metal Pressing Works (P) Ltd. v. Bhaskar Kashinath Thakoor,
(1960) 30 Comp Cas (Bom.) 682 (India).
62
(1998) 93 Comp Cas (Cal.) 725 (India).
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appoint a chairman only for a particular meeting. This was contrary
to the Articles. However, the Supreme Court held that in the
absence of the individuals who held the right to appoint the
forthcoming chairman to enforce their rights, the board was
authorised to remove the chairman so appointed by such
individuals and refused to interfere with the internal management
of the Company.63
This question was raised more recently before the Bombay High
Court in Madhu Ashok Kapur v. Rana Kapoor64 where the court was of
the opinion that a provision in the Articles that allowed for a
particular shareholder to nominate a director cannot be merely
suggestive. Any shareholder would be able to suggest directorial
nominations at a shareholders meeting, even without an enabling
provision in the Articles. The fact that the Articles of the company
specifically allowed a particular shareholder to nominate a director
meant that the majority shareholder, along with the Board, would
be required to appoint a director so nominated. The court also
pointed out that a nominee director is appointed by the Board and
not by the majority shareholder 65 and that the Board must act in
accordance with the provisions of the Articles.66
With the reluctance of the Supreme Court to interfere in the
internal matters of Kashinath and confirmation by the Bombay High
Court in Madhu Kapur, we may safely argue that the right to
nominate specific individuals to the Board of a company by
agreement—in this case, the shareholders agreement—is perfectly
enforceable and legitimate, provided that the same right is reflected
in the Articles and that it does not violate the provisions of the ICA
2013.
In terms of drafting considerations, the shareholders agreement,
and therefore, the Articles, must unequivocally suggest that the
investor shall have the right to nominate and maintain one or more
directors as may be negotiated. In order to further protect the
investor, the clause ought to place obligations upon the promoters
to vote in accordance with the nomination of the investor and upon
the Board to effect the appointment of the nominee director. Lastly,

Id. paras. 118-19.
(2016) 196 Comp Cas (Bom.) 345 (India).
65
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §161(3) (India).
66
Id. §179(1) (stating that “the Board shall be subject to the provisions
contained in that behalf in this Act, or in the memorandum or articles”).
63
64
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in the event of a vacancy of the nominee seat, the investor alone
ought to have the right to appoint a replacement.
b. Quorum Rights at Board and Shareholder Meetings
To conduct a valid meeting in a Company, a minimum number
of persons must be present in the meeting—whether at the Board or
the shareholder level—for the transaction of business, called a
quorum. While various provisions exist to require a minimum
number of persons, there is no express provision under the ICA
2013, which deals with any special quorum rights and generally
with any special rights granted to a specific shareholder or board
member. At the same time, the law does not expressly provide for
a restriction on any such special quorum rights being provided to a
shareholder or board member.
A PE investor will typically require that a shareholders meeting
and, less typically, a board meeting not be quorate without the
presence of the representative or the board nominee of the PE
investor.67 This is likely to be a contentious issue since promoters
may not want to offer opportunities for the business and
management of the company to be frustrated by the non-attendance
of the investor nominee. However, measures may be taken to ensure
that quorum rights do not result in a deadlock of management.
For example, in June 2018, a group of PE firms including SeaLink
Capital Partners, JS Capital, and Quantum Funds invested USD 29.5
million for a 56.34% stake in Surya Children’s Medicare Private
Limited, a company engaged in the ownership and management of
a number of women and child-care specific hospitals throughout
India. 68 As part of this transaction, the investors and promoters
agreed that for a quorate board meeting to take place, at least one
nominee each from investors and promoters be present at all times
67
GEOFF YATES & MIKE HINCHLIFFE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY
TRANSACTIONS 162-163 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010) (discussing
director appointments and quorum requirements for general and board meetings).
68
Sealink deal with Surya Children’s Medicare Priv. Ltd., VENTURE
INTELLIGENCE
DATABASE
(June
2018),
https://www.ventureintelligence.com/dealsnew/dealdetails.php?value=3486780
79/0/Surya (accessible by subscription only). See also Joseph Rai, Sealink Buys Out
OrbiMed From Surya Children’s Medicare, injects fresh funds, VCC NEWSCORP (June 15,
2018),
https://www.vccircle.com/sealink-buys-out-orbimed-from-suryachildrens-medicare-injects-fresh-funds/ [https://perma.cc/VYW8-ECXX].
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throughout the board meeting.69 In order to avoid a frustration of
management due to the non-attendance of either representative, any
meeting for which valid quorum is not met within thirty minutes of
the scheduled time, will be automatically adjourned to the same
venue, time and day of the next week. If quorum is not met at the
adjourned meeting either, the meeting shall get adjourned a second
time to the same venue, time, and day of the following week.
However, adjournments ought to not continue ad infintum. If
quorum is not met at the second adjourned meeting due to the
specific absence of the investor-nominated director, the meeting will
take place regardless, as if the investor nominee were present. 70
However, irrespective of the number of meetings adjourned, these
Articles also provide that in the absence of the investor nominee, the
Board cannot transact on matters that require the affirmative
consent of the investor,71 unless such prior written consent has been
obtained.72
In terms of the ICA 2013, a “quorum” for a valid board meeting
consists of “one-third of a company’s total strength or two directors,
whichever is higher.” 73 The ICA does not provide for special
quorum rights to specific shareholders, although there is no express
restriction on incorporation of such rights. While Indian courts have
acknowledged the presence of quorum rights negotiated by private
equity investors,74 the enforceability or validity of having a quorum
requirement higher than what is provided for has been dealt with
on a few instances. In Amrit Kaur Puri v. Kapurthala Flour, Oil and
General Mills Co. P. Ltd,75 the Punjab and Haryana High Court took
the view that a quorum for meetings provided for in the Articles
may be higher than that provided for in the ICA 1956. Similarly, in
Uma Shankar Gupta v. Vishal Promoters Pvt. Ltd.,76 the Calcutta bench
of the National Company Law Tribunal had the occasion to consider
69
Surya Children’s Medicare Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 3.13,
MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 5 (June 2, 2018).
70 Id. art. 3.14.
71 See infra Section 2(c).
72 Id. art. 3.15.
73
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 174 (India).
74
See, e.g., Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613
(analyzing the enforceability of a shareholders agreement which mandated that a
meeting of the board of directors only constituted a quorum if a nominee of
Vodaphone was present).
75
(1984) 56 Comp Cas (P&H) 194 (India).
76
(2017) 203 Comp Cas (Cal.) 520 (India).
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whether the Articles of a company may prescribe a higher number
of directors to be present for a valid, quorate meeting. The NCLT
opined in the affirmative, stating that the higher number prescribed
in the Articles would not be ultra-vires to the Indian company law.77
This seems to resonate well with the overall view that if the
Articles of a company provide for a higher standard than what is
required in the ICA 2013, then such clauses would be perfectly
enforceable.
A specific clause granting quorum rights ought to include
language that no valid meeting may take place without the presence
of the investor representative or nominee. Further, in the event that
the meeting is required to be adjourned for want of quorum, the
clause should specifically state the mechanism of holding the
adjourned meeting and a requirement of fresh notice, if any. Parties
ought to establish the number of times a meeting may be adjourned
for want of quorum before it may be finally held in the absence of
the investor representative. Of course, in the interests of the
investor, the quorum rights clause must mention that at no stage
may a matter requiring an affirmative vote of the investor be passed
unless in the presence of the investor representative or with the
written consent of the investor.
In terms of shareholder meetings, the statutory requirement of a
quorum in a public company is five, fifteen, or thirty members,
depending upon the total number of members and two members in
the case of a private company. However, Indian company law
makes a specific allowance for the Articles to require a higher
number of members to be present in order for a meeting to be
quorate. Having said that, the Companies Act is silent as to whether
a company may be bound to conduct a shareholders meeting only
with the presence of a particular shareholder.
c. Reserved Matters/Veto Rights
Ordinarily, most issues that are part of the day to day
management of the company are dealt with by the Board.78 Other
matters, such as the appointment of the Board itself, are subject to
shareholder approval, which is obtained at a meeting of
shareholders through simple majority—commonly referred to as an
77
78

Id. para. 26.
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 179 (India).
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ordinary resolution. 79 However, there are matters which are of
some significance to the foundation of the company and may have
far reaching consequences which are subject to a special resolution,
requiring a three-fourths majority vote in favour of the resolution.
This is a remnant from English partnership law, which required
unanimous consent of all partners in a firm to carry out certain
actions.80 However, there are certain matters that are considered to
be more important than those requiring a special resolution and
require the affirmative vote of a particular investor or set of
shareholders.
Reserved or veto or affirmative vote matters or consent rights
are issues that are of particular importance to the investor.81 These
are contractually-agreed matters provided in a joint venture
agreement or a shareholders agreement that need consent of all or
specific partners before being approved and implemented.82 This
issue assumes even more importance from the contractual
perspective. What then stops a majority promoter from unilaterally
altering the terms attached to the investor shares? As a result, rights
available to certain shareholders as mentioned in the Articles may
be protected from amendment by requiring that any amendment of
the Articles requires the affirmative consent of the investor.
For example, in July 2006, Lemon Tree Hotels received an
investment of USD 72.17 million from Warburg Pincus, who picked
up a 24% stake in the company.83 As part of this investment, the
fund required that the following Affirmative Voting Rights be
granted to each of the main shareholders of the company:
Subject only to any additional requirements imposed by the Act
and Article 64.2 below, and notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in these Articles, neither the Company nor Winsome nor
any Shareholder, Director, officer, committee, committee member,
Id. § 114.
Partnership Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, § 19 (Eng.).
81
Cyril S. Shroff & Vandana Sekhri, Indian Update—Companies Act, 2013—
Impacting
M&A
Deals,
XMBA
FORUM
(Sept.
4,
2013),
http://xbma.org/forum/indian-update-companies-act-2013-impacting-madeals/ [https://perma.cc/65MW-X7TP].
82
Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note
13, at 1170.
83
Swaraj Singh Dhanjal & Sneh Susmit, Warburg Pincus set to exit Lemon Tree
(Mar.
20,
2018),
https://www.livemint.com/
Hotels,
LIVEMINT
Companies/oAjkmYinmO5aFd7N0FjuRL/Warburg-Pincus-set-to-exit-LemonTree-Hotels.html [https://perma.cc/VJ4Y-HNE3].
79
80
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employee, agent or any of their respective delegates shall, without
the affirmative written consent or approval of at least one (1)
nominee Director of each of the Principal Shareholders take any
decisions or actions in relation to any of the matters set forth below
(the Affirmative Vote Items), whether in any Board Meeting,
General Meeting, through any resolutions by circulation or
otherwise, with respect to the Company, Winsome or any
Subsidiaries:
(a) Any material change in the nature and scope of the
business.
(b) For each of the Financial Years ending on March 31, 2007,
March 31, 2008 and March 31, 2009, any cumulative capital
expenditure in each such Financial Year in excess of the
higher of (i) Rs. 500,000,000 (Rupees Five Hundred Million)
and (ii) an amount equal to three times the aggregate
EBIDTA of the Company and Winsome, including the prorated share of the EBIDTA in their Subsidiaries based on
their respective shareholdings in such Subsidiaries in the
immediately preceding Financial Year (based on the most
recent Financial Statements of the Company, Winsome and
their respective Subsidiaries) in a single or a series of
transactions. For each of the Financial Years after March 31,
2009, any cumulative capital expenditure in such Financial
Year in excess of an amount equal to two times the aggregate
EBIDTA of the Company, Winsome including the pro-rated
share of the EBIDTA in their Subsidiaries based on their
respective shareholdings in such Subsidiaries in the
immediately preceding Financial Year (based on Financial
Statements of the Company Winsome and their respective
Subsidiaries for such Financial Year) in a single or a series of
transactions. Disposal of assets which results in a capital
receipt in excess of Rs. 100,000,000 (Rupees One Hundred
Million only) in a single or a series of transactions in any
Financial Year.
Till such time as the transactions contemplated under Clause
5 of the Shareholders Agreement are completed in
accordance with the terms thereof:
(i) any disposal of assets or investments in Winsome;
(ii) any revaluation of assets of Winsome; and/or
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(iii) undertaking any new projects or commitments in
Winsome.
(c) Other than as specially required to give effect to the
transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents,
any increase, decrease, or other alteration or modification in
the authorized or issued, subscribed or paid up Equity Share
Capital, or re-organization of the share capital, including
new issue of Equity Securities or other securities or any
preferential issue of shares (voting or non- voting) or
redemption, delisting, buy-back of any shares, issuance of
warrants or securities, or grant of any options over its shares,
determining the timing, pricing, place, stock exchange in
relation to any initial public offering, entering into any
shareholder, joint venture or similar agreement or voting or
other arrangement with a third party, which provides rights
to a third party relating to governance of the Company,
Winsome, and/or any of the Subsidiaries, including veto
rights, and representation on the Board.
(d) Any amendments or modifications to the Charter
Documents;
(e) Related party transactions with any of the Principal
Shareholders and/or their Affiliates, other than the
Management Resolution and arrangements with Current
Investor 2 and/or their Affiliates for procurement of food
and beverages for the hotels operated by the Company,
Winsome and/or the Subsidiaries, provided that each of the
aforesaid are carried out on an arms length basis and in
compliance with the provisions of the Act.
(f) The creation of any Debt beyond an overall Debt: equity
ratio of 1.50: 1.00 on a consolidated basis.
(g) Appointment or re-appointment of any Person other than
Ernst & Young, KPMG, or, PricewaterhouseCoopers as
statutory auditors.
(h) Acquisition of shares or assets of other businesses,
creation of subsidiaries joint ventures / partnership,
mergers, de-mergers, consolidations, winding up and/or
liquidation of the Company, Winsome or any Subsidiaries,
any event that reduces the ownership of the Company or
Winsome in any of their Subsidiaries, inviting any other
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entity or Person to participate or share in any ownership
interest or revenue of any projects or any change in the
existing ownership interest or revenue of any projects of the
Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries including but not
limited to the projects.
(i) Issuance of any shares, options or securities pursuant to
the ESOP beyond 7.5% of the Equity Share Capital or any
changes to the terms and conditions of the ESOP or any
proposal for replacement of the ESOP with a new plan or
scheme.
(j) Other than in relation to Tangerine, in which case the
amount of the obligations shall not exceed Rs. 1,000,000
(Rupees One Million only) in aggregate in a Financial Year,
(i) providing any security for and on behalf of any Person
(other than the Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries); or
(ii) creating any Encumbrance over the assets of the
Company, Winsome or any of the Subsidiaries on behalf of
any Person (other than the Company, Winsome or the
Subsidiaries); or (iii) providing any loan to any Person (other
than the Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries); or (iv)
guaranteeing the Debts of any Person (other than the
Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries). Provided that
nothing contained herein shall be construed as permitting
the creation of any Debt beyond an overall Debt: equity ratio
set out in (f) above.
(k) Any delegation of any of the above.
(l) Any commitment, arrangement, or agreement, verbal or
written to do any of the foregoing.84
It will be noted that most of the critical operations of the
company, such as material changes in the business of the company,
fresh issue of capital, limitations on capital expenditure and debt,
appointment of auditors, amendments to the Memorandum and
Articles of Association of the company, etc., all require an
affirmative vote. In this case, from not just a single shareholder, but
multiple.

84
Krizm Hotels Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 64.1, MINISTRY OF CORP.
AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 26.
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Opinions are divided as to the enforceability of affirmative
voting rights.85 The ICA 2013 allows for entrenchment provisions in
the articles. That is to say, specified provisions of the articles may be
altered only if conditions or procedures that are more restrictive
than those applicable in the case of a special resolution are met or
complied with.86 Thus, a clause requiring an affirmative vote of a
particular shareholder for any amendment in the Articles will be
enforceable.
This has significant ramifications in terms of
enforceability of shareholder rights.
Ordinarily, any amendment in the Articles requires a special
resolution. 87 Therefore, any proposed changes in the rights and
obligations of the parties may be blocked by a shareholder holding
at least 25%. However, it is not unusual to see PE investors taking
up a stake of less than 25%. Out of the 158 transactions surveyed as
part of this paper, 101 involved investors taking up 25% or less stake
in their investee companies. In such transactions, even if the special
rights accorded to the investor have been inserted into the Articles,
in the absence of entrenchment provisions in the form of affirmative
voting rights or veto rights or reserved matters, there is nothing to
stop a promoter holding in excess of 75% from altering these rights
at will. As a result, as long as there are entrenchment provisions in
the Articles, the rights negotiated by the investor and inserted in the
Articles will be safe from unilateral amendment by a promoter
holding a super-majority. It is a different matter, however, whether
those rights are enforceable.
For example, in Feroz Bhasania v. United Breweries,88 the Calcutta
High Court was seized of a matter involving the change of name of
a company, which was barred by an agreement between
shareholders. It was of the opinion that a company may change its
name by a special resolution and that this right cannot be restricted
by agreement.89 As a result, the agreement between shareholders

85
See Padmanabhan Iyer, Veto Rights Relating To Quorum And Voting On
Resolutions—Whether Enforceable Under The Indian Companies Act, 1956?, MONDAQ
(Jul.
25,
2003),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/22063/
Corporate+Commercial+Law/Veto+Rights+Relating+To+Quorum+And+Voting
+On+Resolutions+Whether+Enforceable+Under+The+Indian+Companies+Act+1
956 [https://perma.cc/2NLT-M6QM].
86
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 5(3) (India).
87
Id. § 5.
88
(1971) ILR 1 (Cal.) 367 (India).
89 Id. para. 10.
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was held to be void.90 In the case of In Re: Jindal Vijayanagar Steel,91
the Articles provided for a change in the registered address of the
company on terms more onerous than a special resolution.92 The
CLB held that this was violative of the ICA 1956.93 However, both
changes to the name of the company as well as the registered
address require amendments to the Articles of the Company, which,
in a post 2013 regulatory environ, is now protected under Section
5(3) of the ICA 2013.
This protection to minority shareholders holding affirmative
voting rights is further bolstered when powers of the Board are
made subject to the Articles.94 For example, the Board is empowered
to carry out acquisition of shares or assets or properties under the
ICA 2013.95 However, this is subject to an affirmative vote in the
case of Lemon Tree Hotels and Warburg as mentioned above. As
long as these reserved matters are provided for in the Articles, the
powers of the Board will continue to be restricted, and these
restrictions will be enforceable as against the Board.
However, the appointment of auditors cannot be carried out by
the Board and requires a simple resolution at a general meeting.96
This right of the shareholders has not been made subject to the
Articles in the ICA 2013. The reserved matters clause of Lemon Tree
suggests that the company may appoint one of three Big Four audit
firms as its auditors. While this may seem like a higher standard to
be met by the company, it is difficult to ascertain whether a cause of
action against the appointment of an auditor other than the ones
mentioned in the Articles of Lemon Tree would be maintainable.
Thus, a provision that requires the affirmative consent of a
particular shareholder for the amendment of articles, or any matter
typically carried out by the Board, will be upheld. However, the
same cannot be said about reserved matters outside of these two
categories.

Id. para 11.
(2006) 129 Comp Cas 952 (India).
92
As required under The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament,
1956, § 17 (India).
93
In Re: Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (2006) 129 Comp Cas 952, paras. 7-8 (India).
94
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 proviso to §
179(1) (India).
95
Id § 179(3)(k).
96
Id. § 139.
90
91
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d. Information Rights
Investors will often negotiate for rights to receive or examine
certain financial data or other types of information in the company
independent of information rights received as a member of the
Board. 97 For example, when Norwest Venture Partners FVCIMauritius invested approximately USD 10 million for a 25% stake in
Migliore Webcommunity Private Limited in November 2006,98 one
of the terms negotiated a detailed set of information rights as
follows:
1. Information rights given to the Investor (Norwest),
unless the information has already been provided to the
Board of the company:
a. Audited annual financial statements within 90 (ninety)
days after the end of each fiscal year.
b. Un-audited monthly financial statements within 30
(thirty) days of the end of each month.
c. An annual budget within 45 (forty-five) days of the end
of each fiscal year for the following fiscal year.
d. Annual business plan (including quarterly budget
containing an income statement, a statement of cash flow, a
balance sheet and detailed break-down of working capital)
and headcount, no later than 15 (fifteen) days of the end of
each fiscal year for the following fiscal year.
e. Brief quarterly reports including a narrative describing
the Company’s progress during the prior quarter within 45
(forty-five) days of the end of the relevant quarter.
f. Any material information including resignation of any
member of the Key Employees including persons above the
designation of general manager, or Directors, within a
maximum period of 7 (seven) days.
97
Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note
13, at 1171.
98
S. Bridget Leena, Sulekha.com raises Rs175 Cr from GIC and Norwest Venture
Partners,
LIVEMINT
(Apr.
21,
2015),
https://www.livemint.com/Companies/zSLtCv6K9FrVpmPDsv7Z4O/Sulekhac
om-raises-Rs175-cr-from-GIC-and-Norwest-Venture-Par.html
[https://perma.cc/SK7G-D3MX].
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2. Information rights given to the Board: The Company
shall provide a quarterly reporting package to the Board of
Directors, which shall include all the necessary information
required by any Director and will include monthly
management accounts and updated cash flow forecasts. The
Company shall deliver to the Investor the Company’s annual
budget, as well as audited annual and un-audited monthly
and quarterly financial statements. Furthermore, as soon as
reasonably possible, the Company shall furnish a report to
the Investor comparing each annual budget to such financial
statements. 99
In addition, Norwest was also entitled to reasonable inspection
and visitation rights. These information rights are typical of private
equity transactions across the world.
Under the provisions of the Companies Act 2013, shareholders
have statutory rights to inspect the minute books of general
meetings,100 the Register of directors, key managerial personnel and
their shareholdings,101 and any document, record, register, minute,
etc., which are required to be kept by a company. 102 These
documents may be maintained and inspection shall be allowed for
in electronic form as well. 103 A Kolkata Bench of the National
Company Law Tribunal upheld these inspection and information
rights for shareholders of private companies. 104 In addition,
shareholders must receive a copy of the audited financial statement
along with the auditors’ report at least 21 days prior to the annual
general meeting.105
Therefore, it seems to be fairly well-established that
shareholders are entitled to certain information rights, which may
be categorized into two classes. The first is information rights
arising out of an application or initiation by the shareholder, i.e., the
right to inspect statutorily required registers, minutes, and other
documents as is highlighted in the provisions of the Companies Act
Migliore Webcommunity Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 65, MINISTRY
at 30-31.
100
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 119 (India).
101
Id. § 171.
102
Id. § 120.
103 Id.
104
See M/s. Gopalpur Ports Ltd. v. M/s. Sara Int’l Private Ltd., (2015) SCC
OnLine CLB 293, Kolkata Bench (India).
105
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 136 (India).
99

OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1010

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

mentioned above. The second category of information rights seems
to require a corporate action of proactively providing such
information to the shareholder, as seen in Section 136 of the
Companies Act. It is interesting to note that the information rights
stipulated in the Articles of Migliore, as with many other investee
companies, require higher standards and frequency of information
to be sent by the Company to the investors. The question arises as
to whether the investor would have any recourse under the
Companies Act, 2013, in the event of a breach of these standards.
We have seen in other cases that courts will generally uphold a
set of standards provided for in the Articles that are more stringent
than what is required under basic company law. 106 As a result,
clauses in the Articles that require the company to provide more
information than what is necessary under the ICA 2013 would not
be in violation of Section 6 of the ICA 2013.
3.

INVESTMENT PROTECTION

As noted above, certain clauses in the Shareholders Agreement,
and therefore in the Articles, offer investors a rudimentary oversight
and control over the investee company. These ensure that the funds
made available by the investment are being expended in accordance
with the business plan of the company or on mutually agreed
commercial terms. However, the eventual goal of the investor is to
exit the company by way of a sale of its shares to a third-party buyer
who will replace the investor, or ideally, by way of an initial public
offering. In the interim, parties must ensure that the value of the
investor’s shareholding does not diminish. Further, there must be
appropriate protections for promoters when investors exit the
company by way of sale. These are clauses which protect the
investor’s share value which we will now proceed to examine.
a. Participation in Future Fundraising by the Company
Future rounds of investment which involve fresh issues of
equity will inevitably dilute the existing shareholding of the
investor. Dilution is the reduction of a shareholder’s ownership
106
Kapil N. Mehta, Surat v. Shree Laxmi Motors Ltd., (2001) 103 Comp Cas
(Guj.) 498 (India).
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percentage in a company due to an increase in the paid up share
capital.107 Provisions that protect the investor against (i) dilution of
capital and (ii) dilution of capital at a lower share price are
fundamental to the investor’s shareholding position.108 As a result,
most investors will require that any fresh rounds of investment be
subject to the affirmative consent of the investor. In many cases, the
investor will also require that the new shares be offered to itself first,
before the shares are offered to third parties.
For example, in a subscription of compulsorily convertible
debentures of Bhoruka Power Corporation Limited by Darby Asia
Mezzanine Fund II LLP, the investor required that any further issue
of capital be first offered to the promoters and other shareholders of
the company and that the Investor would have the right to subscribe
to shares on terms as beneficial as those being offered to a third
party. 109 The Articles further provided for an affirmative voting
right in favour of the Investor as to further issue of shares.110 These
clauses ensure that if there is a fresh round of equity funding, it must
be done with the affirmative consent of the investor and the first
offer must be made to the investor itself. However, the question
arises as to whether such clauses are enforceable.
The ICA 2013 requires a special resolution to be passed by the
shareholders at a general meeting111 in order to make a further issue
of shares. This provision effectively builds in a statutory antidilution clause. Therefore, a company cannot issue further capital
without the affirmative consent of an investor holding shares in
excess of 25% of the paid-up share capital. However, investors with
a shareholding of less than 25% may yet seek an affirmative voting
right as noted in Bhoruka above. In a matter before the Karnataka
High Court, the Articles provided for a higher standard to be
maintained or an additional step to be taken, prior to the
authorization of a fresh issue of shares. The Karnataka High Court

107
Casey W. Riggs, Venture Capital Term Sheet Negotiation—Part 7: Anti-dilution
Provisions,
STRICTLY
BUS.
(Mar.
8,
2014),
https://www.strictlybusinesslawblog.com/2014/03/08/venture-capital-termsheet-negotiation-part-7-anti-dilution-provisions/[https://perma.cc/J6QSDGAK].
108
COOKE, supra note 4.
109
Bhoruka Power Corp. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 6, MINISTRY OF CORP.
AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 7-8.
110 Id. art. 16, at 13.
111
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §62(1) (India).
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was of the view that this higher standard would not be violative of
the ICA 1956.112
However, many investors will also include provisions of ‘antidilution’ which apply to occasions when shares are being issued at
a value lower than that of the existing investor.113 Since this erodes
the shareholding value, the existing investor may seek
compensation for such loss. There are primarily two methods by
which such compensation is calculated and paid. The first is the full
ratchet method where the share price of the existing shareholders is
revised to reflect the price of the new issue and additional shares are
issued to the existing investor at no cost to the investor. This is
generally seen to be onerous and burdensome on the promoters and
the company.114
The other method, which is generally more accepted, is the
weighted method. This method takes into account the pre-issue
paid-up share capital as well as the number of shares to be issued.
For example, when Phasorz Technologies Private Limited received
an investment from a number of investors including Bessemer,115
the investors required that for any subsequent issues of equity at a
price lower than what was offered to them (commonly referred to as
a ‘down round’), Phasorz must use a broad based weighted average
to recalculate the share price for Bessemer and other shareholders.116
This adjustment in the share price takes into account (i) the
prevailing price of the shares; (ii) the aggregate number of all the
equity shares outstanding immediately prior to the dilutive issuance
reckoned on a fully diluted basis; (iii) the per share consideration
received by the Company from new investor; and (iv) number of

112
See I.T. Cube India (P.) Ltd. v. I.T. Cube Inc., MANU/KA/8271/2006
(India) (holding that the Articles provided that the Directors had full control over
who shares could be allotted to and under what terms, subject to the sanction of the
company in general meeting).
113
Paul Albert & Ashwin Bhat, Anti-Dilution Protection in Shareholders
Agreement-Implementation Under Indian Laws, MONDAQ (Nov. 1, 2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/750920/Shareholders/AntiDilution+Protecti
on+In+Shareholders+Agreement+Implementation+Under+Indian+Laws
[https://perma.cc/PD8J-7C9A].
114
Riggs, supra note 107.
115
Yuvraj Malik, DocsApp Raises $7.2 Million from Bessemer Venture Partners,
others, LIVEMINT (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.livemint.com/Companies/
KMTcsku6LRIiqOe27LcljK/DocsApp-raises-72-million-from-Bessemer-VenturePartners.html [https://perma.cc/39VU-S7X5].
116
Phasorz Technologies Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, Sched. 4, MINISTRY
OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 69.
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shares actually issued in the dilutive issuance (on a fully diluted
basis).
The ICA 2013 allows for a further issue of shares to the existing
shareholders of the company, either as a rights issue117 or as a bonus
issue. 118 The provisions applicable leave it open-ended as to the
pricing of the rights issue and therefore, a private company would
be able to issue shares to its existing shareholders at a price it deems
fit. However, a bonus issue requires an enabling provision in the
Articles of the company and may be made by converting the
company’s free reserves, securities premium account, or its capital
redemption reserve account into paid up capital. Thus, provisions
relating to anti-dilution would be enforceable under the ICA 2013.
b. Restrictions on Transfer of Shares
Share transferability is restricted under Indian law for private
companies. 119 This is done for a variety of reasons. Indian
companies tend to be closely held, even more so when private and
unlisted and there remains a strong disincentive for promoters
against allowing ‘outsiders’ to gain access to their company
shareholding which would include access to the company’s
confidential information. As a result, parties would like to “know
who they are investing with.”120
On the other hand, because Indian companies are driven
strongly by an individual promoter, their immediate family or a
close-knit network of associates,121 any transfers of shares by these
promoters would signal a lack of confidence in their own company.
PE funds would understandably, be wary of any share transfers by
promoters. As a result, promoters are almost always restricted from
transferring their shares without the affirmative consent of the
investors. This feature, commonly referred to as a ‘lock-in’ also finds
its way into public issues of shares where promoters are required to
hold at least twenty percent of the post issue paid up capital of the
117

(India).

The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 62(1)(a)

Id. § 63.
Id. § 2(68) (explaining that the nature of a private company requires that it
restrict the right of shareholders to transfer shares).
120
Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note
13, at 1172.
121
Varottil, supra note 7.
118
119
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company. 122 Promoters are restricted from transferring this
minimum of twenty percent for a period of three years and are
restricted from transferring any shares in excess of twenty percent
for a period of one year.123
At the same time, promoters would also require some form of
stability as to the presence of the investor. If an investor is allowed
to transfer shares at will, the promoter may require some restrictions
as to a minimum moratorium on the transfer of shares and post that
moratorium, some control over who the investor shares may be sold
to.
For example, when IHHR Hospitality Private Limited accepted
a USD 55 million investment from Morgan Stanley in March 2007,124
the investor and promoter agreed to a common lock-in period of
three years from the date of investment. 125 This meant that no
shareholder could transfer their shares without the express prior
written consent of the other shareholders. Upon the expiry of this
three year time period, the investor would be entitled to transfer
their shares, subject to a right of first refusal 126 in favour of the
promoter.
The question of whether shareholders may bind each other in an
agreement restricting the transfer of their shares has been debated
for a while. 127 Through a series of cases, 128 it was held that no
restrictions on share transfers could be enforced unless specifically
incorporated into the Articles.

122
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure
Requirements) Regulations, 2018, § 14, Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 4 (Sept. 11, 2018)
[hereinafter ICDR 2018].
123 Id. § 16.
124
Sudipto Dey, Morgan Stanley to Take 20% In IHHR, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2007),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/hotels-/restaurants/morgan-stanley-to-take-20-inihhr/articleshow/1862813.cms?from=mdr [https://perma.cc/4VXZ-TVVR].
125
IHHR Hospitality Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 17, MINISTRY OF
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 7.
126 See infra Section 3(c).
127
Niranjan & Varotill, supra note 12.
128
See, e.g., VB Rangaraj v. VB Gopalakrishnan, (1992) 1 SCC 160 (India);
Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia & Others, (2010) 159 Comp Cas
(Bom.) 29 (India); Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India, (2012) 341 ITR 1, at 63
(India).
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While Indian law requires restrictions on the transferability of
shares in private companies,129 the transferability of shares cannot
be restricted in public companies.130 Further, under the proviso to
Section 58(2) of the ICA 2013, parties may enter into contracts or
arrangements in respect to transfer of securities and these will be
enforceable as a “contract.”131 However, this approach under the
ICA 2013 has received criticism on the grounds that it does not
clearly set out the conventional wisdom that shares of a private
company are, by virtue of Section 2(68) of the ICA 2013, subject to
greater restrictions on transferability than in the case of a public
company.132 The extant case law, and therefore the position in law,
seems to focus on the board’s ability to reject a transfer of shares in
pursuance of adhering to the Articles.133
As of now, the ruling in Messer Holdings, when read with the
provisions of Section 58 of the ICA 2013 seems to suggest that
shareholders, whether of a private or a public company, may choose
to restrict the transferability of their shares.134 In the case of private
companies, the restriction must be set out in the Articles. Under
Section 58(1) of the ICA 2013, the board must necessarily reject those
transfers that are not in consonance with the Articles.135

129
The Companies Act 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 2(68) (India)
(the nature of a private company requires that it restrict the right of shareholders to
transfer shares).
130
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §58(2) (India)
(“[T]he securities or other interest of any member in a public company shall be
freely transferrable.”). See also Western Maharashtra Development Corp. Ltd. v
Bajaj Auto Ltd., (2010) 154 Comp Cas (Bom.) 593 (India) (a preemptive right in a
shareholders agreement of a public company is impermissible because it restricts
the free transferability of the shares).
131
Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159 Comp Cas
(Bom.) 29 (India).
132
Niranjan & Varottil, supra note 12 at 5-6, 8-9 (critiquing the lack of clarity
in the state of the current law on the enforceability of agreements which impose
limits on transferability under the Companies Act)
133
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(1) (India)
(providing that a private company may restrict the transferability of its shares).
134
Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159 Comp Cas
(Bom.) 29 (India).
135
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(1) (India).
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c. Pre-emptive Rights
A right of first offer (“ROFO”) requires that an investor who
wants to sell their shareholding in the company must first make an
invitation to offer to the promoter, who will have the option to make
an offer for the shares.136 If the investor accepts the offer made by
the promoter, an agreement to sell the investor’s shares to the
promoter comes into being. If not, the investor will be free to sell his
or her shares to a third party, but only for a higher price than was
offered by the promoter and within a stipulated time period.137
We noted in the Articles of IHHR Hospitality Private Limited
above that when the lock-in period was lifted for the investors, they
would be free to sell their stock subject to a right of first refusal
(“ROFR”)—a variation of the ROFO. When shareholders agree on a
ROFR arrangement, the selling shareholder (typically the investor)
presents the offer made by a potential buyer of the shares, asking the
promoters as to whether they would like to match the terms made
by the potential third party buyer. 138 In other words, an offer is
made by the investor to the promoters on the same terms as had
been offered by the third-party buyer. If the promoter accepts the
offer, an agreement to sell the investor’s shares to the promoter
comes into being. If not, the investor may sell its shares, but only to
the identified third-party buyer and at the same terms as had been
originally offered.139
It is important for the promoters to include a ROFO or a ROFR
clause since it protects the ownership of the company against
outsider influence. That prior to the investor selling its shares and
bringing in a new partner, the promoters would have some
opportunity to consolidate their shareholding or even ascertain who
the potential partner in the form of the third-party buyer is, in the
case of the ROFR. By and large, investors or selling shareholders
prefer the ROFO. This is because when making an invitation to offer
to third-party buyers, the selling shareholder must disclose that the
other shareholders will have an opportunity to match the offer made
by the third-party buyer. As a result, this may discourage the buyer
136
Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note
13, at 1178.
137
Id.
138
David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1,
9 (1999)
139
Id.
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from expending the transaction costs necessary to make a firm
offer.140
Whether to include a ROFO or a ROFR clause eventually comes
down to the preference of the parties to the agreement and is
dependent upon a number of factors, including the negotiating skills
and bargaining position of each party. The question arises as to
whether these processes, privately arranged between the
shareholders, for the sale of shares at a later date, would be
enforceable in a court of law.
We have seen in the previous section that the provisions of the
ICA 2013, 141 when read with Messer Holdings, 142 allow parties to
restrict the transferability of shares in private companies, but only
when the restriction is mentioned in the Articles. A ROFO or a
ROFR clause does not amount to a full restriction, as in the case of a
lock in, but it does amount to a partial restriction in the sense that an
investor will not be able to transfer its shares without an additional
contractual hurdle to cross.
Thus, as far as transfers of shares are subject to a ROFO or a
ROFR clause, providing these restrictions are mentioned in the
Articles, the board must necessarily enforce these restrictions under
Section 58(1) of the ICA 2013.
d. Exit Rights
One of the driving factors of PE investment into unlisted
companies is the eventual aim of having the company make an
initial public offering, creating opportunities for the investor to sell
its shares either through an IPO or through secondary market
transactions. However, depending upon market conditions and
other factors, a public offering may not always be possible, and
investors will seek to exit the company in any case. 143 One
140
See Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra
note 13, at 1178 (explaining the difference between a right of first refusal and the
right of first offer).
141
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(3) (India).
142
Messer Holdings Ltd. & Ors. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159
Comp Cas (Bom.) 29 (India).
143
See Umakanth Varottil, Investment Agreements in India: Is there an “Option”?,
4 NUJS L. REV. 467, 469 (2011) (explaining that put and call options in investment
agreements often serve as exit opportunities for investors in case a public offering
and listing of shares is impossible).
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mechanism used by investors globally is to have the company buy
back shares from the investor. 144 However, a buyback of shares
under Indian law is considerably onerous and may be undertaken
in only specified circumstances.145 Thus, investors may insist upon
a clause requiring the promoters to purchase the investor’s shares
upon the happening of a particular event or upon the expiry of a
time period. This is known as a put option.146
For example, when Om Logistics Limited received an
investment of USD 20 million from Newquest in December 2007,147
the investor required that a put option clause be inserted into the
Articles of the company.148 This clause provided the investors with
the right to require the promoters to purchase all the shares held by
the investor in the event that there had been no initial public offering
within 4 years and 1 month of the investment closing date.149 The
option further provided that the shares would be purchased at a
price150 providing an internal rate of return of 25% over the amounts
invested.151
While there is little concern over the enforceability of the transfer
of shares, there may be some concern over the fixed rate of return or
assured return that the Articles of Om Logistics seem to give
Newquest.
An investment by venture capital investors in India is
considered a capital account transaction to be regulated by Foreign
Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person

144
See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV.
315, 339, 348-50 (2005) (discussing various contractual strategies employed by
venture capitalists to ensure a method to exit their investment including
redemption rights which obligate the company to buy back the venture capitalists’
shares).
145
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 68 (India).
146
See Smith, supra note 144, at 349 (discussing the role of put options as exit
opportunities).
147 See Om Logistics raises Rs 120cr from Merrill Lynch, NSEGUIDE (Jan. 18, 2008),
https://nseguide.com/press-releases/om-logistics-raises-rs-120cr-from-merrilllynch/ [https://perma.cc/8ZLW-BPPB] (reporting on Om Logistics raising 1.2
billion rupees in debt and equity with Merrill Lynch).
148
See Om Logistics Ltd., Articles of Association, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T
INDIA, art. 147 (II)(B) (listing the company’s investor put option rights).
149
Id.
150
Commonly referred to as a Put Option Strike Price.
151 Om Logistics Ltd., supra note 148, art. 147 (II)(B)(d).
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Resident Outside India) Regulations.152 These regulations proscribe
assured returns on investments 153 and prescribe share pricing
methods 154 in case of foreign venture capital or private equity
investments into India.
The regulations enable put options but not at a pre-determined
price.155 The regulations further elaborate on the pricing mechanism
to be used to deduce the share price. In case of an unlisted company,
the exit price can be arrived at as per any internationally accepted
pricing method as long as it is duly certified at an arm’s-length basis
by a Chartered Accountant, a Securities and Exchange Board of
India registered Merchant Banker, or a practicing Cost
Accountant.156
The prohibition on having an assured return as part of a put
option was brought to light in two recent judgments. In Cruz City 1
Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., 157 the parties and their
subsidiaries had entered into various agreements for investment in
real estate projects in India. Due to delay on the part of Unitech,
Cruz City exercised its put option which required Unitech’s
subsidiaries to purchase its shares.158 The Delhi High Court held
that the put option was enforceable. 159 The argument that the
assured return clauses are not enforceable was not accepted on the
ground that the assured return was not absolute and
unconditional. 160 The option could only be exercised within a
specified time and was contingent on the delay in commencement
of the project. Further the Court drew a distinction between assured
return as proscribed by RBI and damages for a breach of contract.161
The Court held that the investor was entitled to its remedies which
included damages. 162 Similarly, in NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons
152
See Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a
Person
Resident
Outside
India)
Regulations,
2017
(India)
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11253&Mode=0
[https://perma.cc/7NJM-944W] (listing the Act’s definitions).
153
Id. § 10(7).
154 Id. § 11(3).
155
Id. § 2(v) Explanation a.
156
Id. § 11(3)(c).
157
(2017) 239 DLT 649 (India).
158 Id. para. 3.7.
159
Id. para. 124.
160
Id. para. 122.
161
Id. para. 120.
162
Id.
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Ltd., 163 if Tata Teleservices Limited failed to achieve certain
performance targets as in the SHA then Docomo could request Tata
to find a buyer for its stake or Tata could acquire the shares at the
fair market price. The guiding principle was argued to be that the
non-resident investor is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the
time of making investment and shall have to exit at the price
prevailing at the time of exit. 164 The issue came up before the Delhi
High Court and was ruled in favour of the parties. The Court held
the enforceability of the provision of the SHA under the terms of
FEMA to be in the nature of downside protection on Docomo’s
investment and not assured return. 165 The judgment further
clarified that the award to Docomo were damages for breach of the
SHA and not the purchase price of the shares.166
Thus, it is clear that courts will uphold put options, they will also
enforce the RBI ban on assured returns on put options, instead
opining that investors may claim damages due to delays or other
lacunae on part of the Indian party. It is therefore not unusual to see
alternative mechanisms within Articles, which seem to have the
same effect as having a put option with an assured return. For
example, the Articles of Om Logistics go on to provide that in the
event that the Put Option Strike Price is greater than the maximum
allowable price under the FEMA pricing guidelines, then the
promoters agree to pay the difference in the form of liquidated
damages.167
The reverse of the put option is the call option, i.e. the right to
require a shareholder to sell their shares to other shareholders.168
However, call options are rarely seen in PE or VC investment
agreements, instead they are more prominent in joint venture and
acquisition agreements where acquirers take a controlling interest
and play a role in the day to day management of the target
company. 169 In any case, call options would amount to a partial
restriction on the transferability of shares and due to the operation
of Section 58 of the ICA 2013, read with Messer Holdings, the same
would be enforceable.
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

(2017) 241 DLT 65 (India).
Id. para. 48.
Id. para. 58.
Id. para. 49-50.
Om Logistics Ltd., supra note 148, art. 147 (II)(B).
Majumdar, supra note 45, at 87-89.
Varottil, supra note 143, at 470.
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An exit by way of an initial public offering (“IPO”) is seen to be
an ideal for venture capital and PE funds alike. 170 Investment
agreements and therefore Articles will typically contain clauses
which require the company and/or promoter to undertake an IPO
within a stipulated period of time.171 Such clauses may also include
the right of the investor to select a merchant bank, to require that the
investor shares be sold first and at a price amenable to the investor,
thus making it a qualified IPO (“QIPO”).172 For example, Guayama
P.R. Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary fund of GE Capital) invested USD
42 million in Gati Infrastructure for a 49.44% stake in July 2013.173
As part of this investment, Guayama P.R. Holdings required that
Gati Infrastructure or its parent company, Amrit Jal Ventures
Limited, carry out an IPO within three years of the investment.174
The clause further allows the investor a number of rights which
include (inter alia): (i) the right to offer its shares to be sold as part of
the IPO; (ii) the right not to be named as promoter and that no shares
of the investor shall be locked in post the IPO; (iii) that the company
shall not carry out an IPO if the minimum exit return required by
the investor is not met; and, (iv) key matters such as preparation of
the offer document, the stock exchanges on which the shares of the
Company shall be listed, the advisors in relation to the IPO
(including the investment bankers, underwriters, book-running lead
managers and legal counsel) and their terms of appointment and
pricing of the IPO shall be decided in consultation and agreement
170
See Smith, supra note 144, at 356 (“substantial evidence suggests that that
the greatest financial returns are to be found in exiting into the public capital
markets.”).
171
See id. at 353 (explaining that demand rights provisions in investment
contracts sometimes stipulate that firms must register shares within a certain period
of time from the signing of the investment contract or from the date of the IPO). See
also Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 J. L., ECON., & ORG.
247, 266 (1994) (discussing how venture capital agreements will stipulate
procedures for future exit opportunities like IPOs).
172
See, e.g., Gati Infrastructure, Articles of Association, art. 166, MINISTRY OF
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 57-58 (stipulating that in the event of an IPO, many
material decisions relating to the transaction including the selection of the
investment bank underwriter, the price, etc. must be made in consultation with the
investor).
173 See generally GE Energy Financial Invests Rs 257 Cr in Gati’s Sikkim Hydel
Project,
HINDU
BUS.
LINE
(Jul.
30,
2013),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/ge-energy-financial-investsrs-257-cr-in-gatis-sikkim-hydel-project/article23116745.ece
[https://perma.cc/TDC6-CR3G] (providing a broad overview of an energy project
that GE invested in).
174
Gati Infrastructure, supra note 172, at 55.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1022

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

with the investor. Similar provisions are included in the event the
parent company undertakes an IPO, in which case shares in the
parent company would be swapped for the shares held by the
investor. In the event that neither company undertakes an IPO, the
company and its parent would be required to undertake an auction
of the investor’s shares. Each of these three events is referred to as
a liquidity event.175
The provisions of this QIPO clause are exceedingly problematic
and it is unlikely that such a clause will be enforceable. There are
two main causes of concern.
The first is the non-classification of the investor as a “promoter.”
The ICDR 2018 defines the term ”promoter” as a person “who has
control over the affairs of the issuer, directly or indirectly whether
as a shareholder, director or otherwise.”176 The definition further
provides that a venture capital fund, alternative investment fund or
a foreign venture capital investor “shall not be deemed to be a
promoter merely by virtue of the fact that twenty per cent or more
of the equity share capital of the issuer is held by such person unless
such person satisfy other requirements prescribed under these
regulations.”177 Therefore, a PE fund would not be classified as a
promoter by mere virtue of its shareholding. However, there
remains the issue of “control.” The term “control” is defined as the
“right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the
management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons
acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by
virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders
agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner.”178
Given that an investor will typically have other rights such as
the right to appoint directors, quorum rights, and most importantly,
affirmative voting rights which give it some element of control over
the management and policy decisions of the company, the question
of whether such rights would amount to control has been repeatedly
asked at the policy making and judicial levels to little avail. In the

175
All of these conditions are stipulated in Gati Infrastructure’s Articles of
Association. See id. at 55-61.
176
ICDR 2018, supra note 122, at § 2(oo)(ii).
177
Id. § 2(oo)(iii).
178
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 2(27) (India).
See also Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares
and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, Regulation no. 2(e), Gazette of India, pt. III sec.
4 (Sept. 23, 2011).
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matter of Subhkam Ventures v. Securities & Exchange Board of India,179
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) took the view that having
the right to appoint a board member and affirmative voting rights
was insufficient to constitute control and that these provisions were
in the nature of protective rights as opposed to control rights. When
the matter was escalated, the Supreme Court refused to address the
issue of what would constitute “control,” holding instead that the
question of law was to be kept open for the time being and that the
order of the SAT was not to be used as a precedent.180 This turn of
events came as a surprise to the investing community who were
looking forward to a narrow definition of the term “control.”181
In 2016, SEBI released a Discussion Paper on “Brightline Tests
for Acquisition of ‘Control’ under SEBI Takeover Regulations” 182
wherein it suggested that appointment rights and affirmative voting
rights in matters that are not part of the ordinary course of business
or involve governance issues would not amount to control. 183
However, no further action has been taken on the said discussion
paper. A similar stance was adopted in the matter of Clearwater
Capital and Kamat Hotels in which SEBI took the view that
covenants in an investment agreement between the two parties were
of the nature of protective rights, rather policies under which to run
the company.184 However, in the absence of a clear indication from
SEBI or the judiciary, that affirmative voting rights do not amount
to control, and with the present definition of “control” in the ICA
2013, it would be difficult to take the view that investors with
179
Securities Appellate Tribunal Order (Jan. 15, 2010) (India), available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/satorders/subhkamventures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PL3-5VNJ].
180
Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Subhkam Ventures Pvt. Ltd.,
MANU/SC/1587/2011 (India).
181
See generally Umakanth Varottil, The Nature of the Market for Corporate
Control in India, in COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL AND ASIAN
PERSPECTIVES 344 (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds., Cambridge Univ. Press,
2017) (analyzing takeover regulation in India).
182
SEC. & EXCH. BD. INDIA, Discussion Paper on “Brightline Tests for Acquisition
of
‘Control’
under
SEBI
Takeover
Regulations”,
https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports/reports/mar-2016/discussion-paper-onbrightline-tests-for-acquisition-of-control-under-sebi-takeoverregulations_31883.html [https://perma.cc/97CT-VYJL].
183 Id. at 6.
184
SEC. & EXCH. BD. INDIA, Order in the matter of Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd.,
WTM/GM/EFD/DRAIII/20/MAR/2017
(Mar.
31,
2017),
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1491380833690.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9KH-8HKG].
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affirmative voting rights which involve policy decisions of the
company do not amount to control.
The second cause of concern in a QIPO clause is the question of
whether an investor may be involved in matters relating to pricing.
The ICDR 2018 stipulates that the issuer, in consultation with the
lead manager may decide the price of the offering.185 An investor by
itself does not have any statutory authority or obligation to affect the
pricing of the IPO. The investor in this scenario, as a shareholder of
the issuer, is only part of such an issuer. However, an investor might
possibly affect the price of the equity shares (or other securities)
through either of the following mechanisms.
If the investor owns 26% or more of the company’s shares, they
can block special resolutions.186 This is significant as Section 62(1)(c)
of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that the further issue of share
capital to any person should be authorized by special resolution.187
Should the price per share be unacceptable to the investor, they can
simply block the special resolution.188 Through this understanding
of control (that control is exercised by denial of the resolution) the
investor is able to ‘affect’ the price—even if they are not necessarily
determining it at the first instance.
Should the investor hold less than 26% of the shareholding, they
may control the pricing by negotiating an affirmative voting right
on the pricing of the IPO or any fresh issue of shares. However, as
mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the enforceability of such an
affirmative voting right remains uncertain.
e. Preferred Payout on Liquidation
As opposed to a more generic liquidity event, which
encompasses a number of corporate actions, it is not unusual for PE
funds to seek a right to have their investment returned to them, with
or without a return on investment, upon the liquidation of the
company.189 Liquidation preference is typically defined as the right
185
186
187
188
189

Pacts,

ICDR 2018, supra note 122, at § 28.
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 114(2) (India).
Id. § 62(1)(c).
Id.
Swaraj Singh Dhanjal, Venture Capitalists Add Tough Riders to Fund-Raising
LIVEMINT
(Nov.
17,
2015),
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of the investor (usually holding preference shares), to receive its
investment amount plus certain agreed percentage of the proceeds
in the event of a ‘liquidation’ of the company, in preference over the
other shareholders.190 This is the only right that, in effect, converts
the equity shares subscribed to by the PE into a preference share.
Preference shares receive dividends and liquidation proceeds in
priority over equity shares.191
The ordering of payouts upon the liquidation of a company is
well settled in the law of insolvency in India. Section 53 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code sets out the order of priority of
distribution of assets for a company undergoing litigation. 192
Specifically, any contractual arrangement which disrupts the order
of priority are to be disregarded by the liquidator.193 Therefore, any
clause in the Articles which gives the investor a preferred payout in
priority over creditors, workmen, government dues or other
preferential payments will not be upheld.
However, a question may be raised as to whether a liquidation
preference between two shareholders holding the same class of
shares may be enforced. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code also
suggests that “at each stage of the distribution of proceeds in respect
of a class of recipients that rank equally, each of the debts will either
be paid in full, or will be paid in equal proportion within the same
class of recipients, if the proceeds are insufficient to meet the debts
in full.”194
The answer to this may be found in a combination of repealed
provisions between the erstwhile Companies Act 1956, the present
Act of 2013, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. In cases of

https://www.livemint.com/Companies/ZdXnzJzgvmZ09EJsPTo1SN/Venturecapitalists-add-tough-riders-to-fundraising-pacts.html [https://perma.cc/J7D6ANQX].
190
Amrita Singh & Siddharth Shah, Liquidation Preference: Get Your Basics
Right,
ECON.
TIMES
MUMBAI
(Jul.
22,
2008)
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Liquidation_prefer
ence_-_Get_your_basics_right.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XSF-68SU]. See also YATES
& HINCHLIFFE, supra note 67, at 144 (discussing liquidation preferences in favor of
private equity investors).
191
Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1163, 1171 (2013). See also The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament,
2013 § 43 (India).
192
The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of
Parliament, 2016 (India), § 53.
193
Id. § 53(2).
194 Id. § 53 (Explanation).
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voluntary winding up, 195 the 1956 Act enabled the assets of a
company to be divided amongst shareholders according to their
rights and interests in the company, subject to the provisions
relating to preferential payments and satisfaction of liabilities in
full.196 However, this provision was also made subject to the articles
of the company as was upheld in Globe United Engineering & Foundry
v. Industrial Finance Corporation of India. 197 Effectively, the articles
could order the priority of payments to shareholders, as long as the
company’s liabilities and preferential payments had been satisfied.
A similar provision existed in the 2013 Act as well.198 However, with
the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016,
Section 320 of the Companies Act, 2013 along with the law related
to voluntary liquidation has since been repealed.199
The present law on voluntary liquidation is found in Chapter V
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). By virtue of Section
59(6) of the IBC, payments must be made in the same order of
priority as is applicable to compulsory liquidation.200 Additionally,
in 2017, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Voluntary
Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2017 were passed, which are
applicable to the voluntary liquidation of corporate persons. 201
Notably, the provisions relating to Section 320 of the Companies Act,
2013 are absent.202

195
The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 510 (India).
(“Provisions Applicable to Every Voluntary Winding Up”).
196
Id. § 511 (“Subject to the provisions of this Act as to preferential payments,
the assets of a company shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its
liabilities pari passu and, subject to such application, shall, unless the articles
otherwise provide, be distributed among the members according to their rights and
interests in the company”).
197
(1974) 44 Comp Cas (Del.) 347 (1973) (India).
198
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 320 (India).
199
The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of
Parliament, 2016 (India), Schedule 11.
200 Id. § 59(6).
201
See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Voluntary Liquidation
Process)
Regulations,
2017,
§
1(3)
(India),
available
at
https://ibbi.gov.in/IBBI%20(Voluntary%20Liquidation)%20Regulations%202017.
pdf (listing the applicability of the Regulations) [https://perma.cc/J94E-76NC].
202
See The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of
Parliament, 2016 § 255 and the Eleventh Schedule, Clause 16 (India), available at
https://ibbi.gov.in/IBBI%20(Voluntary%20Liquidation)%20Regulations%202017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A73K-65PB] (repealing Section 320 of the Indian Companies
Act 2013).
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Two observations may be made from these developments. First,
in the case of voluntary winding up, shareholders would have been
able to create an order of priority amongst themselves, which, if
present in the Articles, would have been upheld by the liquidator or
court due to an enabling provision in both the 1956 and 2013 Acts.
That position has changed in 2017 with the removal of the enabling
provision.
Second, there is no corresponding provision for companies
under compulsory liquidation which would enable shareholders to
privately order priority of payments amongst themselves. In fact,
the IBC clearly suggests that recipients of a class that rank equally
will be paid in full or in proportion and that any agreement which
disrupts the order of priority will be disregarded. 203 If equity
shareholders are considered a class that rank equally, then in the
absence of an enabling provision which allows for the private
ordering of priority payments amongst them, a clause suggesting
liquidation preference would not be upheld.
Practitioners have long suggested that the enforcement of
liquidation preference rights is subject to the interpretation of the
courts, having been “imported” through practice. 204 As noted
above, in the absence of a provision that specifically allows a
shareholder to enforce a liquidation preference, the same ought not
to be included in the SHA or the Articles. As a result, suggestions
have also been made to protect equity or convertible investments
through a combination of other rights including put options, drag
and tag along rights.205 Additionally, the ICA 2013206 read with the
Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules 207 allow for the
creation of classes of equity shares with different rights provided the
articles of the Company authorize them to do so. As a result,
investors may also consider negotiating for preference shares, or a
class of shares separate from those of promoters or setting up an exit
mechanism prior to actual liquidation. However, an equity
shareholder cannot be better placed than a preference shareholder,
Id. § 53.
Ajay Joseph, Can liquidation preference be enforced in India?, VCCIRCLE (May
24, 2016), https://www.vccircle.com/can-liquidation-preference-be-enforcedindia [https://perma.cc/QX64-8LH7].
205
Singh & Shah, supra note 190.
206
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 43(a)(2)
(India).
207
Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules, 2014, Securities and
Exchange Board of India, § 4.
203
204

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1028

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

or any other group of stakeholder’s that fall before equity
shareholders in the waterfall mechanism provided by Section
53(1). 208 Secondly, the Act does not authorise the creation of
different classes of preference shares and hence, one preference
shareholder cannot be at a more beneficial position than any other
preference shareholder. Such an act could be deemed repugnant to
the ICA 2013.209
4.

CONCLUSION

Private equity and venture capital investments are critical to the
promotion of entrepreneurship and the growth of startups. In
exchange for investments, these funds take up equity positions and
share in the risks and rewards in their investee companies. In the
Indian context, where concentrated shareholding in the hands of the
founder or promoter is the norm, PE and VC funds typically take up
a minority position. In order to protect themselves from the selfopportunism of promoters, such investors also negotiate for special
rights as part of the investment. These rights are crystallised into an
agreement between the investor, promoter and the investee
company and by the passage of law, and must be included in the
Articles of Association of the investee company.
This paper highlights the various rights that are typically
negotiated by investors. Broadly, I have divided these rights into
two categories. The first are governance rights, which help an
investor keep an eye on the inner workings of the company and to
ensure that the company uses the invested funds for the proposed
purpose. The second category includes full or partial restrictions on
the transfer of shares as a protection to the investor against loss in
shareholder value.
The issue arises with the treatment of these rights before the
Indian courts. With inordinate delays with the Indian judiciary,
most disputes involving PE and VC investments are either settled
out of court or are arbitrated upon.210 In either case, the outcome of
the dispute resolution process is unknown. Using the scant case law
available and relevant provisions of company and securities law in
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 53(1) (India).
Id. § 6.
210
Vijay Sambamurthi, Recent Developments in Indian Law: Impact on Private
Equity Transactions, 28 NAT'L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 44, 57-58 (2016).
208
209
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India, we have seen how these rights may be treated, should their
enforceability ever come into question.
Courts will uphold the appointment of specific people as
directors on the board of the company 211 and will uphold higher
quorum requirements than those required in the ICA 2013. 212
However, it is not certain as to whether courts will uphold the
requirement of a specific representative to be present at a meeting
for the meeting to be quorate. Certain affirmative voting rights such
as those that require a higher standard to be met in order to alter the
Articles or those that deal with matters which are typically dealt
with at the Board level may be upheld. However, the same cannot
be said for matters that require a members’ resolution. Investors
may require higher standards of information rights, for example,
and it is unclear whether this type of provision would be upheld.
Through the examination of case law relating to how a company
is governed and managed, it seems that courts will, in general, apply
corporate law and norms as a set of standards to be maintained.
These standards are highlighted in the ICA 2013 and elsewhere as to
the minimum requirements for a company to carry out its activities.
There is enough literature to show that corporate law is applied as a
set of standards elsewhere in the world as well.213 It may be then
argued that while the ICA 2013 contains the minimum standards to
be met for a company to carry out its activities, the company and its
constituent elements, including the directors and the shareholders
may hold themselves to a higher standard. These higher standards
must be recorded for reference purposes and where better to record
these higher standards than the Articles of the company? Given that
the Articles are publicly available documents, it stands to
conventional wisdom that a third party engaging with the company
or its constituent elements are made aware of the higher standards
that the company holds itself to. As a result, if we were to view the
gamut of company law as a set of standards that companies have to
211
The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §
149(7)(Explanation), §161 (India).
212
Id. §103; The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 174
(India). See also In Re: Subhiksha Trading Services Limited, (2011) 161 Comp Cas
(Mad.) 454 (India) (holding that an increased quorum is not violative of Section 9 of
the ICA 1956).
213
See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann, & Reinier Kraakman, Agency
Problems, Legal Strategies And Enforcement in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
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meet, there seems to be no reason why courts will not uphold a
higher set of standards.
In terms of shareholder value protection, the ICA 2013, when
read with a number of case law relating to how transfers of shares
may be restricted, allows for a wide variety of full and partial
restraint of transfers. While matters relating to further fundraising
or share transferability are well settled, the same cannot be said for
preferential payouts on liquidation of the company, particularly
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
While legislators have transplanted corporate governance
norms from other parts of the world with varying degrees of
success,214 it seems that corporate law practitioners aren’t far behind.
A large number of these clauses that are negotiated on behalf of
investors seem to emanate from accepted principles of corporation
law in the United States. However, there is little or no reason to
believe that any or all of those clauses would be accepted as
enforceable under Indian law. Therefore, practitioners ought to
exercise caution before transplanting clauses that are seemingly
conventional elsewhere but may not find the same acceptance before
Indian courts.
In this paper, I sought to doctrinally analyse the enforceability of
clauses typically found in PE and VC transactions in India. In terms
of future research, this paper could be the foundation for empirical
studies for PE and VC protection in India and comparative studies
for the same elsewhere in the world. Future research could also
question whether restrictions on the governance of companies and
transferability of shares affects the ease of doing business for
startups and young companies or even amounts to a restraint of
trade. It is hoped that this paper marks the beginning of a more
sophisticated approach towards PE and VC funding in India.

214

Varottil, supra note 7.
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